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ABSTRACT 
In a recent paper, Atkeson and Kehoe (2004) demonstrated the lack of a robust 
empirical relationship between inflation and growth for a cross-section of countries with 
19
th and 20
th century data, concluding that the historical evidence only provides weak 
support for the contention that deflation episodes are harmful to economic growth. In this 
paper, we revisit this relationship by allowing for inflation and growth to have a non-
linear specification dependent on inflation levels. In particular, we allow for the 
possibility that high inflation is negatively correlated with growth, while a positive 
relationship exists over the range of negative-to-moderate inflation. Our results confirm a 
positive relationship between inflation and growth at moderate inflation levels, and 
support the contention that the relationship between inflation and growth is non-linear 
over the entire sample range. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper is a note on Atkeson and Kehoe (2004), “Deflation and Depression: Is 
There an Empirical Link?”  Policymakers since the Great Depression have indeed been 
much concerned that deflation can lead to lower growth rates, if not recessions, and the 
recent Japanese experience has exacerbated such concerns [see Krugman,(1997)]. 
Theoretical models offer differing perspectives. Milton Friedman’s argument that for 
economic efficiency the nominal interest rate should be zero and that the price level 
should fall steadily at the real rate of interest is well known, and has been formally 
reconfirmed by Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1996) and by Cole and Kocherlakota 
(1998) [See also Benhabib and Bull (1983)]. Others, working with calibrated models 
embedding sticky prices and market distortions, find the Friedman rule non-optimal 
[Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004)].  More to the point, Auerbach and Obstfeld (2005) 
find that the welfare and output costs associated with liquidity traps and deflations can be 
very significant.  
Our purpose is not to resolve the differences or to propose another theoretical 
model, but to further pursue the empirical approach of Atkeson and Kehoe by introducing 
an additional perspective. Folklore has it that too much inflation (hyperinflation) is bad 
for the economybecause it increases “shoe-leather” costs, and that deflation is also bad 
because prices are sticky, or because of other less-well understood reasons that have 
something to do with expectations. If so, we should not expect a linear relation between 
growth and inflation, but an inverted U-shaped one. In this note we want to extend 
Atkeson and Kehoe by considering such a non-linear relationship. 
1 
                                                 
1 See also Bruno and Easterly (1998) and Ghosh and Phillips (1998).   2
Following the methodology of Atkeson and Kehoe, we are only attempting to 
characterize the empirical relationship between inflation and economic growth, and do 
not claim that there are any causal conclusions one can draw from our results. Our 
analysis speaks to Atkeson and Kehoe’s conclusion based on a linear specification that 
that data show no obvious relationship, which raises the bar those who claim that 
deflation and depression are closely linked. 
Using a long cross-country panel data set of five-year growth episodes, we first 
confirm Atkeson and Kehoe’s findings of a relatively weak correlation between inflation 
and growth under a simple linear specification. However, we then demonstrate that when 
one allows for a non-linear relationship so as to capture an inverted-U shape, both the 
economic and statistical strength of the relationship increase dramatically in samples 
limited to moderate-to-negative inflation.  
We then divide the sample according to inflation levels, examining the 
relationship in a simple linear specification for samples with average five-year inflation 
levels below and above 5%, 10%, and 15%. Our results again show that for sub-samples 
limited to negative and moderate inflation levels, the relationship between inflation and 
growth is quite strong, with the coefficient estimate for the sub-sample of inflation levels 
below 5% being almost four times that of the full sample Atkeson and Kehoe 
specification. F-tests confirm the instability of the inflation coefficient across these 
thresholds under a linear specification. 
Finally, we examine the robustness of our results to conditioning for the volatility 
of inflation. It has been argued [e.g. Barro (1976), Judson and Orphanides (1999)] that it 
is inflation volatility, rather than inflation itself, that is the primary cause of poor   3
economic performance during high inflation episodes. Nevertheless, our basic results are 
robust to conditioning for inflation volatility, in that we continue to observe that growth 
is positively related to inflation at moderate inflation levels and that the relationship 




Our data set is very similar to that in Atkeson and Kehoe [AK (2004)].
2  Data on 
the general price level and output data up to 1980 are obtained from Rolnick and Weber 
(1997) and Backus and Kehoe (1992) for Argentina (from 1885), Australia (from 1862), 
Brazil (1861), Canada (1870), Chile (1908), Denmark (1871), France (1820), Germany 
(1830), Italy (1867), Japan (1885), Netherlands (1900), Norway (1865), Portugal (1833), 
Spain (1849), Sweden (1861), United Kingdom (1870), and the United States (1820).  
This data runs from early periods to 1992 through 1995 depending on the country. 
Remaining years are filled in using data from the IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics.   
As in AK, we group the data into five-year episodes that start and end in years 9 
or 4, so that the entire depression is contained in a single five year sub-sample. We also 
follow AK by restricting our attention to moderate inflation or deflation, by restricting 
our sample to five year periods that average less than 20% inflation or deflation. 
However, as a control, we also examine a sample that includes all five year periods that 
                                                 
2 We have five extra years of data for Italy, 1862-1867, and one extra year for Argentina, Australia and 
Denmark, 1884, 1861, and 1870 respectively.   4
average less than 40% inflation or deflation, the sample selection chosen by Bruno and 
Easterly (1998). 
Summary statistics are shown in Table 1 for samples excluding five year periods 
with average inflation or deflation exceeding 40 and 20 percent respectively.  Over the 
full sample, our data exhibits a positive correlation between average growth and average 
inflation equal to 0.14 for both the less than 40% and less than 20% samples. However, 
the pre-and post World War II sub-samples demonstrate that the results are likely to be 
sensitive to the sample truncation rule chosen. For the pre-World War II sample, the less 
than 40% truncation reveals a relatively small correlation between inflation and growth 
equal to 0.03 while the less than 20% sample exhibits a larger 0.17 correlation 
coefficient. In contrast, the post-World War II sample shows a 0.15 correlation between 
inflation and growth for the 40% sample, while the less than 20% sample demonstrates a 
smaller correlation equal to 0.08. 
As discussed above, we examine the robustness of our results to conditioning for 
the volatility of inflation, 
2
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where  5 n =  is the length of individual years in each observation period and  t π  is the 
mean level of inflation in period t. Table 1 demonstrates that there is a strong correlation 
between the level of inflation and the volatility of inflation, as would be expected. We 
also tend to find a negative correlation between economic growth and inflation volatility, 
with the exception of the post-World War II sub-sample. 
   5
3. Non-linear Specification 
We first estimate the relationship between inflation and growth under the 
following simple specification 
  ()
2
12 it it it it y α βπ β π ε Δ=+ + + (2) 
 
where  it y Δ  represents average annual growth for country i during five-year period t,  it π  
represents average annual inflation for country i during five-year period t, and  it ε  
represents an i.i.d. normal disturbance term. We impose the restriction that the coefficient 
on the nonlinear term is zero for our linear benchmark and then run the specification 
again with the coefficient unrestricted. We estimate using ordinary least squares with 
White’s correction for heteroskedasticity. 
Our results are shown in Table 2 for the less than 20% and less than 40% samples 
respectively. We run the specification for the full sample and for three historic sub-
samples. Our first sub-sample excludes the depression five year period, 1929-1934, and 
the WWII period, 1939-1949.
3 Our other two samples include dates before and after this 
WWII period. 
Looking first at the linear specifications for the sample with inflation rates below 
20%, it can be seen that inflation enters with a positive point estimate for all of these 
specifications for both samples, and significantly at a five percent confidence level for the 
full sample and the sample excluding the Great Depression and WWII, and at a ten-
percent confidence level for the Before WWII sub-sample. However, inflation is 
                                                 
3 This specification of the Second World War period follows Atkeson and Kehoe (2004).   6
insignificant for the After WWII sample. Since this sample largely matches that in AK, it 
is unsurprising that we obtain a similar point estimate of 0.083 for the full sample.  When 
we include inflation episodes up to an average of 40%, the correlation under a linear 
specification is uniformly weaker, and only statistically significant for the full sample. 
Overall, our linear results confirm the AK finding of a modest, if any, correlation 
between inflation and growth. 
We next allow the nonlinear term to be non-zero. As expected, the nonlinear term 
enters negatively in all specifications, although not always at statistically significant 
levels. It is significant at a 5% confidence level for our full sample. However, the more 
interesting result is that allowing for the non-linear term markedly  increases the 
economic and statistical significance of the coefficient on the level of inflation. In the 
case of the full sample below 20% inflation, the coefficient on the inflation level more 
than doubles, to 0.193, and is now significant at a 1% confidence level. We see similar 
increases when we include the larger under 40% inflation sample, or for the sub-sample 
excluding the Great Depression and WWII or the Before WWII sub-sample. The 
exception is the post-WWII sub-sample, which doesn’texhibit a significant relationship 
between inflation and growth in either the linear or non-linear specifications. 
With the exception of that sub-sample, our results strongly indicate that allowing 
for a non-linear inflation term significantly increases the measured linear relationship 
between inflation and growth. The data driving this result can be seen in Figure 1, which 
plots the below 20 samples and the fitted nonlinear specifications. Again, except for the 
post-WWII sub-sample, we find a pronounced nonlinear relationship between inflation 
and growth. Concentrating on the full sample, it can be seen that this nonlinearity is   7
driven by the fact that episodes of very poor economic performance tend to be associated 
with high or low inflation levels, while episodes of exceptionally strong economic 
performance tend to be clustered around modest inflation levels.
4 
 
4. Sample split into high and moderate inflation levels 
The results above provide some indication that the relation between inflation and 
economic performance is nonlinear, although the sample may be too noisy to closely fit a 
nonlinear specification. In this section, we instead split our samples in two, above and 
below some threshold that may be associated with the level at which inflation begins to 
become problematic. Because the value at which this may occur is uncertain, we examine 
a variety of potential inflation thresholds, including 5%, 10%, and 15% sample splits. We 
then conduct an F-test to determine whether or not the data suggest that the coefficient 
estimate on the level of inflation is stable above and below this threshold. 
For each sub-sample, we first estimate the simple linear specification  
  1 it it it y α βπ ε Δ =+ + (3) 
 
above and below the 5% threshold for the below 20% sample.
5  
Our results are shown in Table 3. For the full sample, it can be seen that there is a 
robust positive correlation between inflation and annual growth below all three of our 
                                                 
4 There are outliers. One notable one in our sample is that of the Netherlands from 1944-1949, which 
experienced a remarkable 21.28% average economic growth along with very high 1336% average inflation 
levels. Of course, the rapid economic growth can be associated with recovery from the war, which is why 
we also examine the results excluding the exceptional war and great depression episodes. 
5 We use the 20% cutoff because it corresponds to AK. Using the larger 40% cutoff would obviously only 
affect the above-threshold sample, while the results below the specified threshold would be identical.   8
posited thresholds. As expected, we obtain the strongest results for the lowest threshold, 
i.e. for inflation below 5%. For that sub-sample, we obtain a coefficient estimate on 
inflation equal to 0.32, close to four times the value of the estimate we obtained for the 
full sample. This point estimate indicates that a 1% increase in the inflation rate would 
correspond to a 0.32% increase in the annual growth rate over a five year period. The 
estimate is statistically significant at a 1% confidence level. Above the 5% threshold, we 
obtain a very insignificant negative point estimate for relationship between inflation and 
growth. Our F-test result confirms that the coefficient on inflation is unstable across the 
5% threshold.  
Moving to higher threshold levels, our qualitative results remain the same. We 
obtain positive and statistically significant point estimate for the relationship between 
inflation and growth below the 10% and 15% thresholds at 1% and 5% confidence levels 
respectively, while the coefficients above these thresholds are negative and insignificant. 
Interestingly, the point estimate on the coefficient diminishes as the size of the threshold 
increases. Our point estimate for the sample below 10% inflation falls to 0.15, roughly 
half the size of the below-5% threshold, and falls again to 0.10 for the below-15% 
threshold. This suggests that the positive relationship between inflation and growth 
diminishes above modest inflation levels. Our F-test for a structural break above and 
below the 15% threshold is insignificant. 
The results for the sub-sample excluding the Great Depression and WWII 
episodes are similar. We obtain a positive and statistically significant coefficient on 
inflation below all of our posited thresholds, and our point estimates again decrease with 
the size of the threshold. Above all three thresholds, we obtain negative, but insignificant   9
coefficient estimates. F-tests confirm the presence of a structural break at statistically 
significant levels for the 5% and 10% thresholds, but not for the 15% threshold. 
We also obtain similar results for the Before-WWII sub-sample. The coefficient 
estimate on the inflation rate is positive and significant for all three thresholds, and 
decreases in the size of the threshold. Above all three thresholds, our point estimates are 
modestly negative and insignificant. F-tests confirm the presence of a structural break at a 
1% confidence level for the 5% and 10% thresholds, and at a 10% confidence level for 
the 15% threshold. 
The great exception, again, is the post-WWII sample, which is insignificant above 
and below all three posited thresholds. Unsurprisingly, the data also fail to confirm the 
presence of a structural break across all three thresholds. Still, even for this sub-sample 
we obtain a relatively large point estimate on the inflation coefficient of 0.16 for the 
sample including inflation levels below 5%. 
Overall, dividing the sample above and below some threshold value gave a much 
stronger indication that there was a positive relationship between inflation and growth for 
modest inflation levels. A notable exception is the post-World War II period, which 
failed to demonstrate a structural break at statistically significant levels for either sample. 
 
5. Inflation volatility 
In this section, we examine the robustness of our results to the inclusion of a 
measure of inflation volatility, measured as the variance of inflation over the five year  10
period. We examine the same specifications as those above with inflation volatility 
measure added. 
Our results are shown in Table 4. Table 4.1 repeats the non-linear specification 
from Table 2 for the full sample and the sub-sample with the Great Depression and 
WWII periods excluded. It can be seen that our point estimates for the inflation 
coefficient and the nonlinear term are basically unchanged. The inclusion of a nonlinear 
term results in a large increase in the coefficient on inflation in levels, to 0.19 for the full 
sample. Inflation volatility enters negatively, but is insignificant except for the linear 
specification with the Great Depression and WWII removed, and then only at a 10% 
confidence level.  
We add our measure of inflation volatility to the linear specifications with 
structural breaks in Table 4.2. Our coefficient estimates for the below-threashold sub-
samples are almost identical to those in Table 3. We again obtain a coefficient estimate of 
0.32 for the below-5% sub-sample, and our point estimate diminishes as the structural 
break threshold increases. As before, our F-tests identify a statistically-significant 
structural break at the 5% and 10% threshold levels, but not at the 15% threshold level. 
The results for the below-threshold sub-sample for the sample excluding the Great 
Depression and WWII are also similar. 
The major innovation from including inflation volatility arises in the above-
threshold sub-samples. Inflation in levels is still very insignificant, but inflation volatility 
enters negatively at a 1% confidence level for all of our posited thresholds. This result 
suggests that the harmful effects of high inflation episodes is associated with the  11




This paper reexamines the long-term evidence on inflation and economic 
performance by allowing for inflation and economic performance to follow a non-linear 
relationship. We find that for low and negative inflation levels, the correlation between 
inflation and economic performance is quite strong. Below a 5% threshold, our 
coefficient estimates indicate that a 1% increase in average inflation levels is associated 
with a 0.32% increase in average annual growth. These results are robust to the inclusion 
of a measure of inflation volatility. Interestingly, we also found that in samples of high 
inflation episodes it was inflation volatility, rather than inflation itself, that had a 
measurable adverse impact on economic growth. 
We should reiterate Atkeson and Kehoe’s acknowledgement that there is no 
causality claim here, rather as in their case, we are just observing the correlations 
between these two variables. However, our results contrast sharply with those of Atkeson 
and Kehoe for low and negative inflation levels, over which the raw data does appear to 
indicate a strong positive link between inflation and economic performance. At a 
minimum, the truncated results seem to provide support for effort by monetary authorities 
to avoid deflationary episodes. 
The one exception to our general results is the After-WWII sub-sample, over 
which we fail to find a statistically significant coefficient between inflation and economic  12
performance, even with the sample of episodes below 5% average inflation. This sample 
includes the Japanese experience in the 1990s, which exhibited poor growth with 
deflation. This might lead some to conclude that while a positive relationship existed 
historically, it has broken down in more modern eras. However, it should be pointed out 
that our point estimate for the relationship between inflation and growth is quite 
comparable to the two full sample values, suggesting that there was not a discernable 
dropoff in the relationship after the war. Instead, it appears that the relationship has 
grown more noisy, resulting in larger measured standard errors and precluding statistical 
inference at standard confidence levels.  13
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Note: Average levels of and correlations between inflation, growth and volatility. 
Definition of volatility is in the text. Statistics for Great Depression are the same for 20% 
and 40% samples 
Table 1: Summary Statistics               









Inflation () π  
Average 





( ) , y ρπ&
  ( )
2 , π ρ πσ   ( )
2 , y π ρ σ &
# obs 
               
Full Sample  3.30  3.04  30.67  0.14  0.19  -0.05  391 
Excluding GD and WWII  3.22  3.19  29.84  0.13  0.17  -0.08  351 
Before WWII (Pre-1939)  0.83  2.47  44.51  0.17  0.28  -0.05  193 
After WWII (Post-1948)  5.70  3.64  15.42  0.08  0.43  0.18  171 
Great Depression  -3.68  -0.18  25.35  0.40  -0.38  -0.32  16 
               
Inflation less than 40%                     
Period 
Average  
Inflation () π  
Average 





( ) , y ρπ&
  ( )
2 , π ρ πσ   ( )
2 , y π ρ σ &
# obs 
Full Sample  4.42  3.07  44.42  0.14  0.49  0.02  411 
Excluding GD and WWII  4.38  3.18  41.13  0.08  0.47  -0.11  370 
Before WWII (Pre-1939)  1.40  2.42  50.99  0.03  0.47  -0.12  198 
After WWII (Post-1948)  7.44  3.72  38.88  0.15  0.63  0.17  186 
               
                    15
 
Table 2: Inflation and Growth         
       
Sample:  Inflation less than 20% 
 
Inflation less than 40%   
Dependent Variable: 










         
Full Sample         
π   0.083**  0.193***  0.056**  0.110** 
  (0.036)  (0.059)  (0.028)  (0.050) 
2 π     -0.010**    -0.002 
    (0.004)    (0.002) 
# Observations  391  391  411  411 
         
Excluding GD and WWII         
π   0.068**  0.123**  0.027  0.091** 
  (0.031)  (0.058)  (0.025)  (0.043) 
2 π     -0.005    -0.003** 
    (0.004)    (0.002) 
# Observations  351  351  370  370 
         
Before WWII         
π   0.104*  0.170**  0.015  0.177** 
  (0.060)  (0.076)  (0.048)  (0.073) 
2 π     -0.010    -0.011*** 
    (0.008)    (0.003) 
# Observations  193  193  198  198 
         
After WWII         
π   0.026  0.051  0.021  0.040 
  (0.039)  (0.114)  (0.031)  (0.068) 
2 π     -0.002    -0.001 
    (0.007)    (0.002) 
# Observations  171  171  186  186 
 
Note: Estimation by OLS with White’s heteroskedasticity correction. *, **, and ***, 
indicate statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. 
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Table 3: Samples Split by Inflation 
Dependent Variable: 
Average Income Growth 
       
  5% π ≤   5% π >   10% π ≤ 10% π >   15% π ≤   15% π >  
             
Full Sample             
π   0.319***  -0.001  0.153*** -0.001  0.103**  -0.001 
  (0.070)  (0.002)  (0.050)  (0.002)  (0.049)  (0.002) 
             
F-value  10.36***  4.78***  2.19 
# Observations  284  141  353  72  377  48 
             
Excluding GD and WWII             
π   0.179**  -0.001  0.133*** -0.000  0.074**  -0.001 
  (0.069)  (0.002)  (0.041)  (0.002)  (0.037)  (0.002) 
             
F-value  3.64**  5.76***  2.08 
# Observations  260  123  323  60  340  43 
             
Before WWII             
π   0.262***  -0.071  0.246*** -0.035  0.121*  -0.070 
  (0.086)  (0.047)  (0.073)  (0.058)  (0.068)  (0.068) 
             
F-value  6.10***  7.76***  2.73* 
# Observations  174  26  183  17  190  10 
             
After WWII             
π   0.184  -0.001  0.015  -0.001  0.005  -0.001 
  (0.166)  (0.002)  (0.057)  (0.002)  (0.048)  (0.002) 
             
F-value  0.64  0.84  0.37 
# Observations  94  103  148  49  161  36 
 
Note: OLS estimates of relationship between inflation and growth using White’s 
heteroskedasticity correction. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10% confidence levels respectively.  17
 
 
Estimates on constant coefficients have been suppressed and are available upon request.  
Table 4: Inflation Volatility and Growth 
 
4.1. Linear and non-linear specifications   
 
Dependent Variable: 










         
         
π   0.091**  0.187***  0.077**  0.110* 
  (0.035)  (0.061)  (0.031)  (0.060) 
2 π     -0.009**    -0.003 
    (0.004)    (0.005) 
2
π σ   -0.003  -0.002 
 
-0.003*  -0.002 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
# Observations  391  391  351  351 
         
4.2. Samples split by inflation 
 
Dependent Variable: Average Income Growth       
  5% π ≤   5% π >   10% π ≤ 10% π >   15% π ≤   15% π >  
             
Full Sample             
π   0.323***  0.003  0.149*** 0.003  0.110**  0.003 
  (0.074)  (0.002)  (0.052)  (0.002)  (0.048)  (0.002) 
2
π σ   0.001  -7.42e-06** -0.002  -7.69e-06*** -0.004*  -7.64e-06*** 
  (0.003)  (3.08e-06)  (0.003)  (2.77e-06)  (0.002)  (2.79e-06) 
             
F-value  10.10***  4.56**  2.19 
# Observations  284  141  353  72  377  48 
             
Excluding GD and WWII           
π   0.182**  0.003  0.132*** 0.003*  0.080**  0.003 
  (0.076)  (0.002)  (0.042)  (0.002)  (0.036)  (0.002) 
2
π σ   0.001  -7.69e-06** -0.000  -8.15e-06*** -0.004**  -8.05e-06*** 
  (0.004)  (3.09e-06)  (0.003)  (2.45e-06)  (0.002)  (2.63e-06) 
             
F-value  3.40**  5.60***  2.08 
# Observations  260  123  323  60  340  43  18
 
 